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INTRODUCTION
On November 4, California voters will decide whether to retain Chief Justice Rose Bird
and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso on the Supreme Court of
California. 1 This election is extraordinarily important because, for the first time in the
history of California judicial retention elections, several Justices are being vigorously
opposed in a multi-million dollar partisan campaign. The campaign against the Justices has
been conducted by conservative organizations through direct mail and advertisements in

I
I

newspapers, radio and television. Although we are used to this in ordinary politics, it is a
cause for great concern in a judicial election. The outcome of the election will affect the
course of the law in California for many years to come. Far more important, the process
by which the election is decided will crucially affect the independence of the judiciary in
California and perhaps in other states as well.
Judicial retention elections were designed to determine whether a Justice has abused
his or her position on the Court, not to test the popularity of a Justice's decisions. This is
the near-unanimous opinion of legal scholars, regardless of their views of these particular
Justices' performance. But the campaign against the Justices has focused almost exclusively
on the outcomes of the Court's decisions -- especially in capital punishment cases -- without

I

regard to whether the decisions were based on proper interpretations of the United States
and California Constitutions and laws. The campaign has played on citizens' fears and
emotions, and has provided almost no analysis of the legal merits or quality of each
Justice's work.

1

LA

Three other Justices -- Malcolm Lucas, Stanley Mosk and Edward Panelli -- also are on the
ballot, but there has been no organized opposition to them.

Beyond this failure to provide analysis of issues, much of the literature presented by
opponents of the Justices contains egregious misstatements about the facts of specific cases
and the positions taken by individual Justices. In fact, an 80 page booklet written by the
was filled with so many inaccuracies that the

California District
Association was
200 page

to revise the

pointing out

booklet after supporters of the Justices issued a

errors. As the Stockton Record said in an editorial,

"Opponents of Chief Justice Bird and two other members of the State Supreme Court ...
ren't going to let facts get in their way

their campaign to remove them from the

bench."

I
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Although California citizens are entitled to more, it probably would be naive to expect
more from those with political axes to grind. Therefore, we were interested to receive, in
the fall of 1985, a pamphlet titled The Court on Trial, which promised to provide an
informed, neutral perspective on the complex issues involved in the election. The pamphlet
was written by Professor Phillip E. Johnson of Boalt Hall Law School at the University of
California at Berkeley and published by two organizations called "The Supreme Court
and "The Foundation for Research in Economics and Education." It was widely
distributed to the media and to lawyers and law professors in California.
The publishers of The Court on Trial indicate that it is designed to provide California
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voters with "timely and concise, yet thorough, information on the critical issues arising in
the public debate about California's highest court." They state that "unfortunately, a
careful analysis of these substantial issues has been avoided by many individuals who
might have been expected to provide one." The publishers assert that, in contrast to the
failures of other commentators, Professor Johnson's pamphlet offers an analysis done with
"care and precision."
If we had read the

cover of the pamphlet more carefully, we might have noticed

that the only examples it gave of instances where "a careful analysis of these substantial
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issues has been avoided" were statements made in support of the Justices. Nonetheless, the
publisher's claims led us to expect an even-handed treatment of the arguments for and
against retention of the Justices who are under attack. Especially in view of Professor
Johnson's impressive credentials as a legal scholar, a pamphlet providing an impartial
analysis of the work of the California Supreme Court would have been extraordinarily
valuable.
Sadly, The Court on Trial is anything but an impartial analysis. It is a partisan brief
against the Court -- especially against its Chief Justice. It is a cleverly written brief. But
because of its claims to neutrality and impartiality, it is a fundamentally dishonest one.
We write this response because we think it is important that citizens and the media not be

I
I

misled by its claims to nonpartisanship.
In the interest of full disclosure, we should say that most of us consider ourselves
"liberals" and that all of us support retention of the Justices attacked by Professor Johnson.
Indeed, for the reasons stated in the final section, we support the retention of all the
Justices seeking retention, including those who are generally viewed as "conservative."

I
I
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ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS IN "THE COURT ON TRIAL"
The Court on Trial is divided into five sections. It begins with an overview of the
election process. It then discusses whether the election is a threat to judicial independence.
The third and fourth sections contain Professor Johnson's analysis of court decisions in two
areas: the death penalty and reapportionment. The final section is entitled "The Real Issue:
Judicial Responsibility." In every one of the sections, the tone, the choice of cases, and the
way in which the arguments are developed (or not developed) belie the claim that this
pamphlet is an effort to provide a balanced and impartial analysis.

I
I

Section 1. "The California Judicial Elections of 1986"
This introductory section sets the tone for the rest of Professor Johnson's argument and
typifies his approach throughout the pamphlet. Ostensibly, this section describes the
election process and comments on the significance of the election. In fact, Professor
Johnson repeatedly casts the Justices with whom he disagrees -- especially Chief Justice
Rose Bird -- in the most unfavorable light, and chooses words and phrases designed to
appeal to readers' prejudices rather than to aid in the analysis of the issues. The following
passage is illustrative:

I
I

Symbolically, the election will be interpreted as a test of public
acceptance of liberal judicial activism. The California Supreme Court in
recent years has been a consistent and effective champion of liberal
causes .... Overturning a long series of court of appeals decisions, it has
made California one of the few states where public employees have an
explicit right to strike. It has expanded the opportunities for injured persons
(and their lawyers) to recover large sums in damages from corporations,
insurance companies, and public entities.
. . . To those who believe that the court's agenda is also the
constitution's agenda, this is all as it should be. To many other people, the
Court is pursuing a controversial social program and calling it law. The vote
in the nation's largest state on its liberal court -- and especially on its liberal
Chief Justice -- will be widely interpreted as the next thing to a national
referendum on the legitimacy of liberal judicial activism. [p. 2] ...

4

Maintaining the pretense of nonpartisanship, Professor Johnson does not, in so many
words, condemn "liberal judicial activism." But the passage plainly conveys his own belief
that the Justices have the "agenda" of "pursuing a controversial social program and calling
it law" and that this improper. (The very terms of the description are misleading: As
Federal Judge Abner Mikva has written, "the judiciary is the one branch that is not able to
set its own agenda" because it can only respond to cases brought by litigants. 2 )
Though Professor Johnson repeatedly trades on the pejorative connotations of the
phrase "judicial activism," he never defines it -- and for good reason. 3 The phrase is
typically applied to judges who are too willing to overturn legislative decisions. Yet he

I
I

sharply criticizes the Court for upholding the State Legislature's apportionment plan, for
upholding rent control ordinances adopted by the Cities of Berkeley and Santa Monica [fn.

22], and for upholding a municipal library tax against the claim that it violated Proposition
13. 4 [p. 2, fn II) In fact, Professor Johnson's real objection is not to activist judges, but to
liberal ones. The real message of The Court on Trial is that voters should reject justices

who are liberal.
Professor Johnson's statement of what the election will "symbolize" also is strikingly
one-sided. The publicity campaign against the Justices has focused almost exclusively on a
single issue -- the death penalty. The outcome of the election most likely will turn on the
public's view of whether the Court, in its concern for due process, is being too "easy" on

I

2

Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 587
(1983).
3

In a public debate on whether the Justices should be retained, Professor Johnson
pointedly refused to respond to the request to say what he meant by a "liberal activist
judge." See The Biltmore Debate" (transcript of debate on retention of the Supreme Court
Justices, May 29, 1986) pp. 17, 22, 25.
4

In discussing various cases, Professor Johnson generally fails to reveal in the text that the
Justices he considers "liberal" do not always vote the same way. A reader would have to
parse all the footnotes to discover this.

5

people convicted of capital offenses. Therefore, if the Justices are defeated, the election
may symbolize the fact that judges had better follow public opinion on controversial legal
issues or else risk losing their jobs. In addition, as Professor Steven Shiffrin of UCLA has
noted, "This is the first [judicial] election in which corporations, insurance companies,
banks and agribusiness have invested large sums in an effort to pack the Court." 5 If they
are successful, the election may come to symbolize that judges had better curry favor with
powerful lobbies if they want to remain in office. And because the election campaign has
focused on the outcome of decisions rather than on the Justices' legal reasoning, their
defeat may also symbolize that it is right to select judges based on whether we like the way

I
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they vote, regardless of whether their decisions are legally correct or justifiable.
Professor Johnson does not mention any of these other symbolic meanings of the
election. For someone writing a partisan brief against the Court, this categorization is not
surprising. As a legal scholar's supposedly neutral interpretation, it is appalling.
Professor Johnson's description of the campaign process is also one-sided, and is based
entirely on innuendo. He says nothing about the interest groups attacking the Justices or
about the misleading literature and ads being used in their campaign. But he does warn
readers about the Justices' supporters:
Lawyers will necessarily take a leading role in the campaign, but the
public should be aware that some lawyers are not necessarily disinterested.
Chief Justice Bird has been raising campaign funds chiefly from the trial
lawyers who specialize in representing injured persons in lawsuits. These
lawyers have plenty of money to contribute in part because the Chief Justice
and her colleagues have enormously increased the opportunities for
individuals to recover substantial damages from corporations, insurance
companies, and the taxpayers. [p. 4] ...

I

5

"The Biltmore Debate" (transcript of debate on retention of the Supreme Court Justices,
May 29, 1986) p. 10. Governor Deukmejian has already appointed two Justices to the
Supreme Court. If the three Justices under attack are defeated, he will have appointed five
of the seven Justices sitting on the Court.

6

Professor Johnson provides no support for the implication that the public should be more
wary of statements by supporters than those by opponents. He does not allude to the
political and economic motives of many opposition groups. Nor does he substantiate the
insinuation that Chief Justice Bird has sought the support of trial lawyers or that these
lawyers have been improperly enriched by virtue of the Court's decisions. 6
Of course, there are organized interests that favor recent decisions of the California
Supreme Court -- labor unions, minorities, environmentalists, homeowners, feminists,
Democrats; and there are other organized interests that oppose them -- lending institutions,
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agricultural and industrial corporations, insurance companies, Republicans. Many of these
groups have lawyers to help them, but those that oppose the Court are, if anything, better
financed and have access to many highly paid attorneys.

I

In sum, in the first section of The Court on Trial, Professor Johnson does not articulate
the issues at stake in the election or describe the decisions of the Court in anything
approaching a fair or balanced manner. As we discuss below, his substantive treatment of
the legal issues is similarly one-sided and hardly (as the pamphlet claims) a study done
with "care and precision."

Section 2. "Is the Election a Threat to Judicial Independence?"
The State Bar has cautioned voters that the election poses serious threats to judicial

I

independence. A substantial majority of all the full-time law professors in California have

6

As the quoted passage suggests, Professor Johnson repeatedly appeals to popular suspicions
of lawyers in his attacks on the Justices. On page 2, in arguing that the Court has "been a
consistent and effective champion of liberal causes" he gives as an example that the Court
has "expanded the opportunities for injured persons (and their lawyers) to recover large
sums in damages." On page 5 he states that Chief Justice Bird in particular has been a
dedicated protector of the interests of lawyers. In fact, the Chief Justice's opinions that
affect lawyers' fees seem to result from her general view that tort law should provide
substantial protection to victims, from her unwillingness to interfere with jury verdicts and
awards, and from her concern that indigents receive effective assistance of counsel.

7

signed a petition urging the retention of the Justices to assure "an independent Supreme
Court free of political interference."
In sharp contrast, Professor Johnson repeatedly implies that the election presents no
danger whatever to judicial independence. 7 Although he comments briefly on the argument
of one noted supporter of the Court, former State Bar President Anthony Murray, he
neither presents nor considers the concerns expressed by the wide range of people who
believe that the way this election is being contested poses a serious threat to judicial
independence and the judicial process.
Indeed, concerns about the threat to judicial independence are not limited to the

I
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Justices' supporters. For example, although Professor Michael Moore of the University of
Southern California School of Law strongly criticizes the Court's death penalty decisions,
he emphasizes that "we need insulation of our judiciary from popular pressure. One of our
courts' most important functions is to protect minority rights and unpopular causes against
the potential tyranny of a majority . . . . In a constitutional democracy even the despised
have rights that should not be violated even by a legislature representing the majority's
wishes. Otherwise none of our constitutional rights would be worth much" 8
An independent judiciary is the only check on overreaching by temporary political

I
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majorities. The judiciary plays a mediating role, making sure that laws are considered in
terms of the basic constitutional principles that underlie our society. If partisan judicial
elections induce judges to cater to majority opinion, then judges will cease to perform this
essential role -- they will be less vigilant in protecting constitutional rights, especially the
7

Indeed, Professor Johnson downplays the very value of assuring that the Supreme Court is
independent from political pressures. Only in the very last paragraph of the entire
pamphlet does he acknowledge that "we ought to be concerned with protecting the
independence of the Judiciary .... " If this concession comes as a surprise in view of the
pamphlet's overall approach, Professor Johnson immediately qualifies it with the remark
that "judicial independence is not the only principle ...."

8

"Politics is Not the Basis for Judging," Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1985.

8

rights of unpopular persons. Efforts to rid a court of either "liberal" or "conservative"
jurists may also undermine its crucial role of providing (to quote Professor Moore again)
"principled consideration of the social issues of our time."
People may disagree about the emphasis to place on these concerns. We do not suggest
that the mere invocation of the phrase "judicial independence" should end the debate. But
these surely are legitimate concerns. Professor Johnson never addresses them. In most of
this section, he merely asserts that the Justices have been "overreaching and arrogant,"
without backing up the claim. He dismisses, in an offhand manner, the threat posed by
partisan and dishonest attacks on the Court. Politics will be politics, according to Professor

I
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Johnson.
Professor Johnson states: "If enough of us make an effort to bring out the real issues,
there is no reason why the public cannot become ... well informed." We certainly hope that
this is true. However, especially in view of the highly emotional and distortion-laden
campaign to defeat the Justices, it is disingenuous to imply that most citizens will enter the
voting booths with a real understanding of the quality of the work of each of the Justices
under attack. In any event, Professor Johnson does his best to assure that the reader will
not focus on the substance of the issues but will instead be guided by passion or prejudice.

I
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He concludes the section with an attack on the credibility of the lawyers who are
defending the court and states that "the voters should not permit lawyers to evade serious
discussion of the substantive issues by invoking platitudes." We only wish that The Court on
Trial avoided platitudes and misrepresentations so that its readers had a fair chance of

understanding the substantive issues.

Section 3. The Death Penalty
On most issues, politicians are at risk if they criticize a court. If they castigate judges
as being pro-abortion, for example, they may have to answer to those voters who believe

9

that abortion ought to be left to each individual woman's choice. But the issue of crime is
different: If you rail against a court for "coddling criminals" you can make lots of friends
without risking making many enemies. Nor surprisingly, those who oppose the California
Supreme Court, whatever their true interests and concerns, have focused on the Court's
criminal cases, and in particular its death penalty decisions. For this reason there is special
need

a careful and thoughtful discussion of these cases. In fact, some excellent and

balanced discussions of the death penalty in California have been published in the past
year, 9 but Professor Johnson's treatment of the topic only contributes to the misconceptions
about the death penalty litigation.

I
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Professor Johnson's stated goal is to explain why California has not carried out any
executions since the 1960's. After implying that this situation is peculiar to California, [p.6]
he attributes the situation to these factors: a) "the death penalty itself is so controversial it
spawns controversy over a host of side issues"; b) "capital defendants in California tend to
have very aggressive and imaginative lawyers ..."; and c) "the arguments made by all these
attorneys find a receptive audience in justices who are personally opposed to the death
penalty, or at least highly skeptical of its moral and constitutional legitimacy". [p.6] In
elaborating these points, Professor Johnson again provides a one-sided and misleading
picture.
Perhaps the most glaring deficiency is Professor Johnson's implication that the

I

California situation is unique. He begins his analysis by describing the constitutional
background of the death penalty laws in California. He mentions the California Supreme
Court's 1972 decision in the Anderson case (6 Cal.3d 628) holding that the death penalty

9

The most thorough and scholarly discussion is by Gerald F. Uelmen, Dean of the Santa
Clara Law School, California Death Penalty Laws and the California Supreme Court: A
Ten Year Perspective, prepared for the Senate Committee on Judiciary of the California
Legislature (April, 1986). A less technical set of articles, by Dan Morain and others, was
published in the Los Angeles Times, August 18 to 21, 1985.

10

was unconstitutional, and the United States Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Gregg v.
Georgia (428 U.S. 153) holding that it is constitutionally permissible under some
circumstances. [p.4] Incredibly, however, nowhere in the five pages of text and ten pages
of footnotes devoted to the death penalty does Professor Johnson so much as mention the
most important death penalty decision of the century, Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 349),
where

1972 the United States Supreme Court decided that all death penalty laws then in

effect in the United States were unconstitutional.
Furman and the many United States Supreme Court cases interpreting it have created
an immensely complex federal death penalty jurisprudence; they have restricted the use of

I

the death penalty and complicated the process of reviewing death sentences in every state;
they have created an array of barriers against the implementation of death penalty laws.

I

There is nothing special about the situation in California. Twenty-five of the thirty-eight
states with death penalty laws have executed no one since Furman. Virtually all the
executions have occurred in a few Southern states -- states whose systems of criminal
justice Californians might well not wish to emulate. Professor Johnson never mentions that
the sitLation in California is typical of the situation in the majority of the states in this
country.
Professor Johnson's treatment of the reasons for the delay in executions is also
troubling. He indicates that the court is concerning itself with "side issues," implying that

I

these issues are not of major legal significance. Yet the "side issues" he identifies -- the
criteria which justify a death sentence, the methods by which jurors are chosen for capital
cases, and the instructions given to jurors -- all are of major constitutional import. The
California Supreme Court is required to deal with them, and if it did not, the federal
courts certainly would, 10 and would further delay resolution of the legal issues.
10

Professor Johnson discusses the court's handling of these "side issues" in a series of
footnotes. These analyses, which may be of interest only to lawyers, contain some seriously
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Professor Johnson further attributes what he calls the execution "stalemate" to the fact
that "capital defendants in California tend to have very imaginative and aggressive
lawyers, particularly on appeal" -- lawyers who "are extraordinarily resourceful at finding
new arguments and prolonging appeals." This may well be true. It is not unique to
California. Like most other states, California has followed the United States Supreme
Court's long-standing view that those facing the death penalty must be given quality legal
representation. (It is is also true, of course, that the California Attorney General's office
provides the State with outstanding representation.) In any event, the Court must deal with
the issues brought to it; the better the attorneys, the more challenging the issues they are

I
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likely to raise.U
misleading descriptions. For example, in his discussion of the Witherspoon rule, which
limits the power of the prosecutor to exclude prospective capital jurors who have general
moral or political doubts about capital punishment, Professor Johnson says that "[t]he
California Supreme Court has reversed many death verdicts for what is called
'Witherspoon' error,'" based on something "the United States Supreme Court ... said (in a
footnote)," and he adds that the California Supreme Court has interpreted Witherspoon
"enthusiastically." [p.6 n.34]
Professor Johnson does not mention that what the United States Supreme Court said in this
footnote was the supreme law of the land and made Witherspoon one of the most important
criminal procedure cases of the past twenty years. The Witherspoon rule governed capital
trials and appeals in every court in the United States, and required the reversal of
hundreds of death sentences in dozens of states. California's experience with Witherspoon
was not exceptional; it was relatively routine.

I

At other points as well, Professor Johnson is selective and misleading. For example, he
claims that the court's 1980 Hovey decision (28 Cal.3d I), which prescribed certain jury
questioning procedures in capital cases, was a misadventure based on "a study conducted by
an assistant professor of psychology at the University of California at Santa Cruz." [p.6
n.43] It is hard to believe that Professor Johnson really thinks that references to a
researcher's academic rank add anything to an intellectual debate. But the major fault of
this argument is not that it is snide. In arguing the Hovey case, the California Attorney
General stated that he had no objection to the rule the Court ultimately announced -- a
point noted in the Hovey opinion but not mentioned by Professor Johnson.
11

Professor Johnson admits that the work of capital defense attorneys in California was
made easier by the passage of the Briggs death penalty initiative, which cluttered up
California's death penalty laws with poorly drafted and unconstitutional provisions. [pp.89] He neglects to mention that it was ardent political advocates of the death penalty who
wrote and promoted this initiative -- many of them now active in the anti-Court campaign

12

The major claim in this section of The Court on Trial is his assertion that
arguments made by all these attorneys find a receptive audience in justices who are
personally opposed to the death penalty, or at least highly skeptical of its moral and
constitutional legitimacy." [p.6] Professor Johnson offers no support for this insinuation
about the integrity of the justices. He does not cite a single statement in which any of the
Justices expresses any personal, political or moral view of the death penalty. Instead, he
implies that because he disagrees with the Court's decisions, those decisions can only be
explained by political bias or private moral opinion.
In attempting to demonstrate the extreme length to which the California Supreme Court
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has gone in reversing death sentences, Professor Johnson devotes much attention to one
case, People v. Frierson. [pp. 7-8] Because his treatment of it typifies his selective and
misleading statements of the cases and the law, we review it at some length.
Professor Johnson acknowledges that Frierson won a unanimous reversal of his first
death verdict because defense counsel had been incompetent in investigating and preparing
a defense of "diminished capacity." After this reversal, at Frierson's second trial, his new
defense attorney prepared the diminished capacity defense but decided to withhold it at
the guilt phase and present it only at the penalty phase. Frierson vigorously disagreed and
asked the trial judge to let his choice govern, but the judge denied his request. The

I

defense lawyer thought that the diminished capacity claim was so weak that it would
offend the jury at the guilt phase, but that it might be a possible last hope at the penalty
phase. Acting on this logic, the lawyer presented no defense on guilt. Frierson himself
wanted to get the diminished capacity evidence in at the guilt phase, in the hope of
avoiding a penalty trial altogether. The defense lawyer's refusal to follow his client's wish
resulted in a 4 to 2 reversal of Frierson's second conviction (Frierson II).
-- while leaders of the capital defense bar argued publicly against the Briggs initiative, in
part on the ground that it included so many provisions of doubtful constitutionality.

13

It is unclear why Professor Johnson chose this case for extended discussion, or what he
thinks it proves about the Justices up for reelection. The majority's opinion in Frierson II
was written by retired Justice Otto Kaus, a distinguished judge widely regarded as a
judicial moderate; the dissenters included Joseph Grodin, one of the "liberal" justices who is
up for reelection. Professor Johnson says that it illustrates how, with the current California
Supreme Court, "[e]ven if the trial judge and prosecutor did everything perfectly, decisions
made by the defense lawyer can lead to a new trial." [p.7] 12 This statement is simply false.
Frierson II was not a case in which neither judge nor prosecutor erred. Frierson pleaded

I

with the trial judge to overrule his court-appointed defense lawyer's decision not to present
any defense at the guilt phase, and it was precisely the trial judge's error in refusing
Frierson's request that led to the second reversal.

I

On the merits of Frierson II, Professor Johnson concedes the plausibility of the Court's
holding that a defendant must be allowed to make his own decision whether or not to
present a defense at the guilt phase of a capital trial. But he goes on to say that while the
Court may have been right as an "abstract matter," it fa.iled to employ practical wisdom
because, in Professor Johnson's view, the lawyer was right in thinking that the diminished
capacity claim would backfire with the jury. [p.8] Even this very weak criticism of
Frierson II is based on Professor Johnson's omission of a crucial fact: In his closing
argument urging imposition of the death penalty, the prosecutor exploited the defense
lawyer's failure to use the diminished capacity defense earlier in the trial, arguing that his
delay in introducing it until the penalty phase proved how weak it was. In short, it was
the defense lawyer's supposedly sophisticated strategy that backfired. The California

12

Although not discussed by Professor Johnson, there is nothing extraordinary about an
appellate court reversing a conviction where the prosecutor and judge have not erred. The
United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that the U.S. Constitution requires that
convictions be reversed if a defendant has been denied effective assistance of defense
counsel.

14

Supreme Court opinion mentions the prosecutor's damaging argument. Professor Johnson
does not.
There are many other distortions and omissions in Professor Johnson's discussion of the
death penalty in California; it would be tedious to identify and correct them all. The
important point is that his lengthy analysis is not what it purports to be -- a detached,
scholarly review of this complicated issue. Its appearance of scholarship may make
opponents of the Justices feel more comfortable, but in the end Professor Johnson's
argument adds up to the claim that we should vote against the Justices because California,
like most other states, has not yet executed anyone in this decade.

I
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Section 4. Reapportionment
Professor Johnson devotes four pages of The Court on Trial to criticizing the Court's
handling of the constitutional issues involved in the State's legislative redistricting in the
1980's. His claim is that the Justices he opposes have acted on purely political grounds.
Briefly, these are the facts: The United States and California Constitutions prohibit
congressional and legislative districts that are not equally apportioned -- that violate the
criterion of one-person-one-vote. By contrast, neither Constitution had 13 been read to
prohibit partisan gerrymandering. After the 1980 census, the state's congressional and
legislative districts were gross! y malapportioned. In 1981, the Democratic-controlled

I

legislature established new districts, which many people believed were gerrymandered to
favor the Democrats. The Governor signed the measure, and Republicans immediately
sponsored an initiative measure asking voters to reject the new districts. The Supreme
Court of California was called upon to decide whether the initiative was valid and also to

13

We say "had" because, as we explain below in the text, the United State Supreme Court
recently held that partisan gerrymandering could be unconstitutional under some
circumstances.

15

decide which districts should be used in the 1982 general election -- the old malapportioned
ones, which were based on the 1970 census, or the new properly apportioned but
gerrymandered ones adopted by the legislature.
The Court had been faced with a somewhat analogous choice in 1972. At that time,
however, the Governor had vetoed the legislature's apportionment statute, and the Court
held that the old, malapportioned districts should be used until a new statute was enacted.
In the 1982 case, the Court held that the initiative stayed the effective date of the
statute. It unanimously held that the legislature's 1981 plan should be used for
congressional districts, since the old districting did not reflect the two additional

I
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Representatives to which California was now entitled. And the Court divided 4-to-3 over
which plan should be used for state Senate and Assembly districts. The majority, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Bird, held that the new state districts should be used; the
dissenters favored interim use of the districts based on the 1970 census. The majority
based its decision on a number of factors, including the undisputed fact that the old
districts were unconstitutional, and the belief that using the new districts would minimize
disruption since they had been lawfully adopted and would have the force of law if the
referendum challenging the new districts failed. The majority asserted that, as between a
law enacted by the legislature and signed by the Governor, and a referendum challenging
it, it should assume the validity of the existing law.

I

As it turned out, the voters did reject the legislative districting, but they also rejected a
proposal to set up a non-partisan districting commission. In 1982, the newly-elected
legislature enacted a new districting plan, which Governor Brown signed into law. After
Governor Deukmejian was elected, he called a special election to adopt an alternative plan
(the "Sebastiani initiative"). Relying on precedents holding that the legislature may only
engage in one redistricting per decade, the Court, with only one Justice dissenting, held the

16

initiative invalid. In a final attempt to establish new districts, Governor Deukmejian then
sponsored a constitutional amendment, which was defeated in the 1984 election.
As this brief description reveals, the questions raised by the case were very complex.
As Justice Kaus, who joined in Justice Richardson's dissent, wrote: "Obviously, there is
much to be said on each side of the only issue that divides the majority and Justice
Richardson's dissent." Under these circumstances, Professor Johnson's completely one-sided
attack on the majority is hard to justify.
Professor Johnson does not mention that the old districts were unconstitutional, but
that gerrymandering, however undemocratic, was not. Though he quotes at length from
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Justice Richardson's dissent, he does not allude to the language quoted above from Justice
Kaus, who was widely regarded as an exemplar of judicial craftsmanship and neutrality.
While emphasizing the close division in the first case, he fails to mention that the later
decision striking down the Sebastiani initiative was nearly unanimous. At no point does he
indicate that whichever way the Court decided would have a partisan political impact.
Rather, he implies that the Court has systematically favored the Democrats, and writes that
it is "n

wonder that the voters are tempted to exercise some influence over state

lawmaking by voting to change the state Supreme Court, particularly when the justices are
among those responsible for the decline of politics." 14 [p. 12]
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Professor Johnson also says that the "[t]he 1982 decision is particularly questionable
because two liberal members of the Court (Mosk and Kaus) joined in Justice Richardson's
stinging dissent .... The four Justices who formed a majority to reject that solution were
Bird, Newman and Broussard (all appointed by Governor Jerry Brown), and retired Court
of Appeals Justice Tamura. Tamura was sitting on the case under special assignment by
Chief Justice Rose Bird." [p.l3] The fact that the liberal members of the Court were
divided is at least as consistent with an apolitical interpretation as a political one.
Professor Johnson's suggestion that Judge Tamura's vote was questionable because he was
sitting under special assignment by the Chief Justice is typical of the innuendo that
pervades the pamphlet. In fact, a scholarly study of Chief Justice Bird's special assignment
procedures praises her for establishing "a neutral system for the assignment of pro tern
justice, improving upon the system that was in place when she took office," and notes that
under the system "a chief justice cannot predict how a pro tern justice will vote." Wildman
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If the California Supreme Court is "responsible for the decline of politics." it is only by
virtue of its failure to remedy legislative gerrymandering. In this respect it followed the
lead of the United States Supreme Court and most other state courts, which have
historically kept out of this area in the belief that their intervention would throw the
judiciary into the midst of partisan politics. Ironically, here Professor Johnson's complaint
against the Court is that it is not activist enough, for a Court declaring gerrymandering
unconstitutional might be viewed as a "liberal activist" Court. In fact, this past June, when
the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that gerrymandering can violate
the Constitution, liberal Justices were in the majority and the most conservative Justices --
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Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor -- dissented.

Section S. The Real Issue: Judicial Responsibility
In the final section of The Court on Trial, Professor Johnson indicates that the central
issue in the election is one of "judicial responsibility." He acknowledges the value of
judicial independence, but emphasizes that the electorate should be concerned with judicial
responsibility: "Any justice who lacks an understanding of the appropriate limits of the
judicial power is not responsible and ought to be removed." [p. 14]
We, too, would vote against a Justice who lacks an understanding of "the appropriate
limits of judicial power." The problem facing the electorate, however, is how to determine

I

whether a particular Justice has violated these limits. The appropriate role of judicial
power is an issue that has divided thoughtful and informed people throughout our history,
and continues to divide them today. Obviously, the criterion one applies in evaluating a
Justice's behavior is critical.

& Whitehead, A Study of Justice Pro Tempore Assignments in the California Supreme
Court, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1985).
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Professor Johnson proposes a straightforward political test. He states: "The ... ultimate
issue is a simple one, not so very different from the question the public has to answer in
voting on an incumbent Governor or Senator." (p. 4] The issue is whether the voter "trusts"
the Justice.
Trust the Justice to do what and on what basis? Voters might distrust a Justice based
on a thoughtful consideration of his or her votes and opinions in cases. But they may also
distrust a Justice because they do not like the outcome of a few highly publicized cases,
even if the decisions are required by law. Moreover, voters may be led to distrust a Justice
by a well-financed partisan campaign that is intended to generate distrust.
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Professor Johnson does not discuss these distinctions. Yet it seems obvious to us that
Professor Michael Moore (a critic of Chief Justice Bird) is correct when he writes that
"Judgeships are not like ordinary political offices. Judges need insulation from popular
pressure, even when that pressure is exerted through the ballot box" 15 Deciding how to
vote in a judicial retention election is a very different matter than picking a candidate in
an openly partisan election for governor or senator. A Justice is not irresponsible or
untrustworthy merely because he or she is characterized as "liberal" or "conservative" or
"activist" or "restrained." While there is no single agreed-upon formulation of the best
standard for assessing judges, we believe that the essential issue is whether the justice has
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decided cases on a fair interpretation of the constitution, statutes and precedents, rather
than on the basis of merely personal or political views. (Some of us doubt that most
citizens will have enough information available to make this assessment, and believe that as
voters we should hold ourselves to an even more restrained standard under which we
should vote to retain a Justice unless he or she has clearly engaged in misconduct in
office.)

15

"Politics is Not the Basis for Judging," Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1985.
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This issue is, indeed, a difficult one, and in casting their votes, citizens may have to
rely more than they usually do on the opinions of professionals who have studied the
matter. This places a special obligation on lawyers and law professors to present the issues
clearly and objectively, or at least not to disguise partisan briefs as impartial academic
studies. Those opposing Chief Justice Bird and Justices Grodin and Reynoso, no less than
their supporters, bear these obligation to the voters of California and share a long-term
interest in assuring the integrity of our judicial system.

ADDENDUM

I
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IS THE "SUPREME COURT PROJECT" WHAT IT CLAIMS TO BE?

The Court on Trial was only the first of a series of so-called "Backgrounders" on the
upcoming judicial retention elections published by the "Supreme Court Project." Even the
pamphlet's cover gave rise to some doubts about this organization's claim to be an
"impartial platform for discussion and expert analysis." As we mentioned earlier, when the
back of the pamphlet deplores the absence of "careful analysis," it only gives examples of
statements supporting the Justices' retention.
In any event, the overall course of Supreme Court Project's belies its claim of
nonpartisanship. Of the five "Backgrounders" that have been published so far, one is
genuinely neutral: this is the transcript of a debate between law professors opposing and
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supporting the Justices' retention, held at the Los Angeles Biltmore Hotel. The others are
highly partisan. The Supreme Court on Trial, as we have discussed at length, is an attack on
Chief Justice Bird and other "liberal" members of the California Supreme Court. The
Project's third Backgrounder, titled Why Has Justice Lucas Ceased Concurring on CarlosGarcia, is nothing more than a brief against the California Supreme Court's holding that
the death penalty may only be imposed if the accused intended to kill the victim. The
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pamphlet explains that the author must remain anonymous because he is "deeply involved
in legal proceedings concerning the very Carlos-Garcia issues" and therefore "his public
commentary on them could compromise those proceedings." [p. I]
But since the facts stated in the pamphlet are public record, verifiable
without regard to who assembled them, . . . [we] take responsibility for the
Backgrounder's accuracy. Readers may decide for themselves whether or not
the author's conclusions follow logically from the facts proved .... [p. I]
It goes on to assert that because of the author's anonymity, "the Backgrounder must stand
on its own. We believe it does." (Emphasis added.)
Like most legal briefs, of course, the pamphlet contains little in the way of facts;
rather, it consists mostly of argument. The argument is strongly critical of the Carlos-
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Garcia doctrine. There is no effort to present both sides. We leave it to the reader to
reconcile the publisher's approval of the author's position, with its claim to be "an
impartial platform for discussion and analysis of the Supreme Court" and "an alternative to
organizations that promote or oppose particular issues." (Ironically, on the bottom of same
page that the Backgrounder affirms its belief in the author's views, the pamphlet states:
"Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the Supreme
Court Project.")
The Supreme Court Project's fourth publication is by Gideon Kanner, a professor at
Loyola Law School. Titled "California's Supreme Court Justices: Umpires or Policy
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Makers?", it is a no-holds-barred attack on the modern Court. The same is true of the
Project's most recent Backgrounder, "A Foray in Judicial Policy Making," by Richard
McDonald, a recent graduate of Loyola Law School.
There is nothing wrong with either conservative-leaning or liberal-leaning
organizations funding writings about the election. Political ideology provides a framework
or perspective for evaluating the opinions of a Justice. But there is something very wrong
with pretending to be a neutral forum while emphasizing a particular viewpoint. Until and
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unless the Supreme Court Project shows that it is genuinely committed to presenting all
sides of the issues, readers of its pamphlets should treat its "Backgrounders" as no more
than covert operations in the campaign against Chief Justice Bird and Justices Grodin and
Reynoso.
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